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Abstract
In this paper we explore relaxations of (Williams) coherent and convex
conditional previsions that form the families of n-coherent and n-convex
conditional previsions, at the varying of n. We investigate which such
previsions are the most general one may reasonably consider, suggesting
(centered) 2-convex or, if positive homogeneity and conjugacy is needed,
2-coherent lower previsions. Basic properties of these previsions are stud-
ied. In particular, we prove that they satisfy the Generalized Bayes Rule
and always have a 2-convex or, respectively, 2-coherent natural extension.
The role of these extensions is analogous to that of the natural extension
for coherent lower previsions. On the contrary, n-convex and n-coherent
previsions with n ≥ 3 either are convex or coherent themselves or have no
extension of the same type on large enough sets. Among the uncertainty
concepts that can be modelled by 2-convexity, we discuss generalizations
of capacities and niveloids to a conditional framework and show that the
well-known risk measure Value-at-Risk only guarantees to be centered 2-
convex. In the final part, we determine the rationality requirements of
2-convexity and 2-coherence from a desirability perspective, emphasising
how they weaken those of (Williams) coherence.
Keywords. Williams coherence, 2-coherent previsions, 2-convex previ-
sions, Generalised Bayes Rule.
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1 Introduction
In his influential book Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities [21], P.
Walley developed a behavioural approach to imprecise probabilities (and pre-
visions) extending de Finetti’s [5] interpretation of coherent precise previsions.
Operationally, this was achieved through a relaxation of de Finetti’s betting
scheme.
In fact, following de Finetti, P is a coherent precise prevision on a set S of
gambles if and only if for all m, n ∈ N0, s1, . . . , sm, r1, . . . , rn ≥ 0, X1, . . . , Xm,
Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ S, defining G =
∑m
i=1 si(Xi − P (Xi)) −
∑n
j=1 rj(Yj − P (Yj)), it
holds that supG ≥ 0. The terms si(Xi − P (Xi)), −rj(Yj − P (Yj)) are pro-
portional (with coefficients or stakes si, rj) to the gains arising from, respec-
tively, buying Xi at P (Xi) or selling Yj at P (Yj). A coherent lower prevision
P on S may be defined in a similar way, just restricting n to belong to {0, 1}.
This means that the betting scheme is modified to allow selling at most one
gamble. Several other betting scheme variants have been investigated in the
literature, either extending coherence for lower previsions (conditional lower
previsions) or weakening it (previsions that are convex, or avoid sure loss). In
particular, a convex lower prevision is defined introducing a convexity constraint
n = 1,
∑m
i=1 si = r1 = 1 in the betting scheme. In [21, Appendix B] n-coherent
previsions are studied, as a different relaxation of coherence.
In this paper, we explore further variations of the behavioural approach
/betting scheme: n-coherent and n-convex conditional lower previsions, formally
defined later on as generalisations of the n-coherent (unconditional) previsions
in [21]. Our major aims are:
a) to explore the flexibility of the behavioural approach and its capability to
encompass different uncertainty models;
b) to point out which are the basic axioms/properties of coherence which
hold even for much looser consistency concepts.
Referring to b) and with a view towards the utmost generality, we shall mainly
concentrate on the extreme quantitative models that can be incorporated into a
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(modified) behavioural approach. This does not imply that these models should
be regarded as preferable to coherent lower previsions. On the contrary they
will not, as far as certain questions are concerned. For instance, inferences will
typically be rather vague. However, it is interesting and somehow surprising to
detect that certain properties like the Generalised Bayes Rule must hold even
for such models, or that they can be approached in terms of desirability.
N -coherence and n-convexity may be naturally seen as relaxations of, re-
spectively, (Williams) coherence and convexity. These and other preliminary
concepts are recalled in Section 2. Starting from the weakest reasonably sound
consistency concepts, we explore 2-convex lower previsions in Section 3. In
Section 3.1 we characterise them by means of axioms, on a special set of con-
ditional gambles generalising a linear space and termed DLIN (Definition 2,
Proposition 2). Interestingly, it turns out that n-convexity with n ≥ 3 and con-
vexity are equivalent on DLIN . 2-convex previsions display some drawbacks: in
Section 3.2, it is shown that a 2-convex natural extension may be defined and its
properties are discussed, but its finiteness is not guaranteed. Moreover, as de-
tailed in Section 3.3, the property of internality may fail (with some limitations,
for instance lack of internality cannot be two-sided); agreement with conditional
implication (the Goodman-Nguyen relation) is not guaranteed either. In Sec-
tion 3.4, we show that the special subset of centered 2-convex previsions is not
affected by these problems. In Section 4, 2-coherent lower previsions are dis-
cussed and characterised on DLIN (Proposition 9). We compare 2-coherence
and n-coherence in Section 4.1: again, n-coherence (n ≥ 3) and coherence are
equivalent on DLIN . N -coherent previsions (n ≥ 3) defined on a generic set of
gambles S have no n-coherent extension on sufficiently large supersets when-
ever the equivalence does not hold already on S. We show also that 2-coherence
should be preferred to 2-convexity when positive homogeneity and conjugacy are
required. The 2-coherent natural extension is introduced and studied in Section
4.2. 2-coherent lower previsions always have it. The extent of the Generalised
Bayes Rule for 2-coherent lower previsions is discussed in Section 4.3. Models
that can be accommodated into the framework of 2-convexity or 2-coherence,
but not of coherence, are presented in Section 5. We focus on how 2-convexity
can motivate defining conditional versions of capacities and niveloids, and on
the consistency properties of Value-at-Risk, a well-known risk measure which is
centered 2-convex, but may even fail to be 2-coherent. In Section 6 we analyse
2-convexity and 2-coherence in a desirability approach. Generalising prior work
by Williams [22, 23] for coherence, we focus on the correspondence between
these previsions and sets of desirable gambles, and on establishing the ensuing
desirability rules. The major differences with the rules for Williams coherence
are pointed out in the comments following Propositions 17 and 20. Section 7
concludes the paper. An earlier presentation of the topics in this paper, less
extended and without proofs, was delivered at the ISIPTA’15 Symposium [16].
3
2 Preliminaries
The starting points for our investigation are the known consistency concepts of
coherent and convex lower conditional prevision [13, 14, 22, 23]. They both refer
to an arbitrary (non-empty) set D of conditional gambles, that is of conditional
bounded random variables. We denote by X|B a generic conditional gamble,
where X is a gamble and B is a non-impossible event (B 6= ∅). It is understood
here that X : IP → R is defined on an underlying partition IP of atomic events ω,
and that B belongs to the powerset of IP . Therefore, any ω ∈ IP implies either
B or its negation ¬B (in words, knowing that ω is true determines the truth
value of B, i.e. B is known to be either true or false). Given B, the conditional
partition IP |B is formed by the conditional events ω|B, such that ω implies B
(implies that B is true) and X|B : IP |B → R is such that X|B(ω|B) = X(ω),
∀ω|B ∈ IP |B. Because of this equality, several computations regarding X|B can
be performed by means of the restriction of X on B. In particular, it is useful
for the sequel to recall that sup(X|B) = supB X = sup{X(ω) : ω ∈ IP, ω ⇒ B},
and inf(X|B) = infB X = inf{X(ω) : ω ∈ IP, ω ⇒ B}.
As a special case, letting Ω be the sure event, we have that X|Ω = X is an
unconditional gamble. Further, A|B is a conditional event if A is an event (or
its indicator IA - we shall generally employ the same notation A for both).
As customary, without further qualifications, a lower prevision P is a map
from D into the real line, P : D → R. However, a lower prevision is often
interpreted as a supremum buying price [21]. For instance, if a subject assigns
P (X|B) to X|B, he is willing to buy X, conditional on B occurring, at any price
lower than P (X|B). Referring to this behavioural interpretation, the following
Definitions 1, 3, 5 require different degrees of consistency for P , according to
whether certain gains depending on P avoid losses bounded away from 0. They
differ as to the buying and selling constraints they impose.
Definition 1. Let P : D → R be given.
a) P is a coherent conditional lower prevision on D iff, for all m ∈ N0,
∀X0|B0, . . . , Xm|Bm ∈ D, ∀s0, . . . , sm ≥ 0, defining S(s) =
∨{Bi :
si 6= 0, i = 0, . . . ,m} and G =
∑m
i=1 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)) − s0B0(X0 −
P (X0|B0)), it holds, whenever S(s) 6= ∅, that sup{G|S(s)} ≥ 0.
b) P is a convex conditional lower prevision on D iff, for all m ∈ N+,
∀X0|B0, . . . , Xm|Bm ∈ D, ∀s1, . . . , sm ≥ 0 such that
∑m
i=1 si = 1 (con-
vexity constraint), defining Gc =
∑m
i=1 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)) − B0(X0 −
P (X0|B0)), S(s) =
∨{Bi : si 6= 0, i = 1, . . . ,m}, it is sup{Gc|S(s)∨B0} ≥
0.
b1) P is centered convex or C-convex on D iff it is convex and, ∀X|B ∈ D, it
is 0|B ∈ D and P (0|B) = 0.
In the behavioural interpretation recalled above, Definition 1a) considers
buying at most m conditional gambles X1|B1, . . . , Xm|Bm (also no one, when
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m = 0) at prices P (X1|B1), . . . , P (Xm|Bm), respectively, and selling at most one
gamble X0|B0 at its supremum buying price P (X0|B0). The gain G is a linear
combination with stakes s0, . . . , sm of the m+ 1 gains from these transactions.
It is conditioned on S(s), to rule out both trivial transactions (G = 0, since
s0 = . . . = sm = 0) and the case that G = 0 because no transaction takes place
(when B0, . . . , Bm are all false). Then, coherence requires the non-negativity of
the supremum of G, conditional on at least one non-trivial transaction being
effective. The interpretation of Definition 1b) is similar: what changes is the
convexity constraint on the stakes (s0 = 1), s1, . . . , sm. This implies that Gc is
the gain from one selling transaction and at least one buying transaction.
The definition of coherent conditional lower prevision is a structure free
version of Williams coherence, discussed in [14]. It is more general than Walley’s
coherence [21], in particular it is not necessarily conglomerable and always allows
for a natural extension, i.e. there exists an extension on any set of a Williams
coherent assessment that is Williams coherent too and least committal. The
notion of convex lower prevision is still more general, and was introduced in
[13], extending the unconditional convexity studied in [11]. Convex previsions
can incorporate various uncertainty models, including convex risk measures,
non-normalised possibility measures, and others. However, the special subclass
of C-convex lower previsions guarantees better consistency properties. Among
these, there always exists a convex natural extension of these measures, whose
properties are analogous to those of the natural extension [13, Theorem 9].
Even though coherent and convex lower previsions can be defined on any set
of conditional gambles, they are characterised by a few axioms on the special
environment DLIN defined next.
Definition 2. Let X be a linear space of gambles and B ⊂ X a set of (indicators
of) events in X . Suppose that Ω ∈ B and that X is stable by restriction, i.e.
BX ∈ X ,∀B ∈ B,∀X ∈ X . Setting B∅ = B − {∅}, define
DLIN = {X|B : X ∈ X , B ∈ B∅}. (1)
Note that, since B ⊂ X , the condition Ω ∈ B implies 1 ∈ X and, therefore,
X contains all real constants.
The sets DLIN may be viewed as generalisations to conditional gambles
of linear spaces of unconditional gambles, to which they reduce when B =
{Ω,∅}. Not surprisingly then, characterisations on DLIN have an unconditional
counterpart on linear spaces.
Proposition 1. Let P : DLIN → R be a conditional lower prevision.
a) P is coherent on DLIN if and only if [23]
(A1) P (X|B)− P (Y |B) ≤ sup{X − Y |B}, ∀X|B, Y |B ∈ DLIN .
(A2) P (λX|B) = λP (X|B),∀X|B ∈ DLIN ,∀λ ≥ 0.
(A3) P (X + Y |B) ≥ P (X|B) + P (Y |B), ∀X|B, Y |B ∈ DLIN .
(A4) P (A(X − P (X|A ∧B))|B) = 0,∀X ∈ X ,∀A,B ∈ B∅ : A ∧B 6= ∅.
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b) P is convex on DLIN if and only if (A1), (A4) and the following axiom
hold [13, Theorem 8]
(A5) P (λX + (1 − λ)Y |B) ≥ λP (X|B) + (1 − λ)P (Y |B),∀X|B, Y |B ∈
DLIN ,∀λ ∈]0, 1[.1
Remark 1. Exploiting some equivalences between axioms or groups of axioms,
Proposition 1 as well as the later Propositions 2 and 9 could be restated in a
different form. For instance, axiom (A1) is equivalent to the following
(A1′) If X|B, Y |B ∈ DLIN , µ ∈ R are such that X|B ≥ Y |B+µ, then P (X|B) ≥
P (Y |B) + µ.
Axiom (A1’) is also equivalent to monotonicity plus translation invariance:
- If X|B, Y |B ∈ DLIN and X|B ≥ Y |B, then P (X|B) ≥ P (Y |B) (mono-
tonicity).
- If X|B ∈ DLIN , µ ∈ R, then P (X + µ|B) = P (X|B) + µ (translation
invariance).
Alternatively, (A1) may be replaced in Proposition 1 by P (X|B) ≥ inf(X|B),
∀X|B ∈ DLIN , thus corresponding to the original version in [23].
Condition (A4) is the Generalised Bayes Rule (GBR), introduced in [22, 23]
and studied also in [21] in the special case B = Ω.
Since our discussion will focus on minimal consistency properties for a con-
ditional lower prevision, we have to mention a generalisation to a conditional
framework of the implication (inclusion) relation between events, which is termed
Goodman–Nguyen relation (≤GN ). In fact, suppose A⇒ B (or A ⊆ B). Then,
asking that µ(A) ≤ µ(B) is a really minimal rationality requirement for any
µ aiming at measuring how likely an event is, given that, whenever event A
proves to be true, B comes true too. The following extension of the implication
to conditional events was proposed in [10]:
A|B ≤GN C|D iff A ∧B ⇒ C ∧D and ¬C ∧D ⇒ ¬A ∧B. (2)
The Goodman-Nguyen relation ≤GN was further extended to conditional gam-
bles in [15]:
X|B ≤GN Y |D iff IBX + I¬B∨D sup(X|B) ≤ IDY + IB∨¬D inf(Y |D)
showing that X|B ≤GN Y |D implies P (X|B) ≤ P (Y |D) for a C-convex or
coherent P [15, Proposition 10].
1 Recall that the lower prevision P is termed convex referring to the convexity constraint∑m
i=1 si = 1 in Definition 1 b), not to axiom (A5), which actually tells us that P is concave,
as a real functional.
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3 2-convex lower previsions
In Definition 1, a) and b), there is no upper bound to m ∈ N. One may think
of introducing it as a natural way of weakening coherence and convexity. More
precisely, let us call elementary gain on Xi|Bi any term siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)),
with the proviso that −B0(X0−P (X0|B0)) in Definition 1 b) is also an elemen-
tary gain, formally corresponding to s0 = −1. Then, we may decide that no
more than n elementary gains are allowed in either G (Definition 1, a)) or Gc
(Definition 1, b)). When doing so, we speak of n-coherent or n-convex lower
previsions. This approach extends the notion of n-coherent (unconditional) pre-
vision in [21, Appendix B].
Intuition suggests that the smaller n is, the looser the corresponding consis-
tency concept is. In the extreme cases n may be as small as 1 with coherence,
2 with convexity.
However, 1-coherence is too weak. In fact, P is 1-coherent on D iff, ∀X0|B0 ∈
D, ∀s0 ∈ R, sup{s0B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))|B0} ≥ 0.
It is easy to see that this is equivalent to internality, i.e. to requiring that
P (X0|B0) ∈ [inf(X0|B0), sup(X0|B0)], ∀X0|B0 ∈ D.
Remark 2. (1-Avoiding Uniform Loss (1-AUL))
A still weaker concept is that of 1-Avoiding Uniform Loss (1-AUL). Say that
P is 1-AUL on D iff ∀X0|B0 ∈ D, ∀s0 > 0,
sup{s0B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))|B0} ≥ 0. (3)
The condition of 1-AUL is equivalent to P (X0|B0) ≤ sup(X0|B0), ∀X0|B0 ∈ D.
In particular, this implies P (0|B) ≤ 0, ∀0|B ∈ D.
The wording 1-AUL suggests its derivation from a concept of Avoiding Uni-
form Loss (AUL), which may in fact be obtained from Definition 1 a) by re-
placing ‘m ∈ N0’ with ‘m ∈ N+’ (and consequently the gain G with GAUL =∑m
i=1 siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)), si ≥ 0).
The notion of 1-AUL has an ancillary role in the theory of 2-convex and 2-
coherent lower previsions: it is a rather mild prerequisite to certain properties.
In this sense, there is a similarity with the role of the condition of AUL for
convex previsions [11, 13] (cf. also Remark 3 in Section 4.2).
Since internality alone does not seem enough as a rationality requirement,
we turn our attention in this section to what seems to be the next weakest
consistency notion, that is 2-convexity.2
Definition 3. P : D → R is a 2-convex conditional lower prevision on D
iff, ∀X0|B0, X1|B1 ∈ D, we have that, defining G2c = B1(X1 − P (X1|B1)) −
B0(X0 − P (X0|B0)),
sup(G2c|B0 ∨B1) ≥ 0. (4)
2 2-convex previsions were termed 1-convex in [2, 15]. Here we prefer the locution ‘2-convex’
by analogy with the rule for fixing n (as the number of elementary gains) in ‘n-coherent’ in
[21].
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3.1 Basic properties of 2-convex lower previsions
We explore now some basic features of 2-convex previsions. Some critical aspects
are discussed next, showing in Section 3.4 that they can be solved resorting to
the subclass of centered 2-convex previsions.
A remarkable result in our framework is the characterisation of 2-convexity
on a structured set DLIN .
Proposition 2. A conditional lower prevision P : DLIN → R is 2-convex on
DLIN if and only if (A1) and (A4) hold.
Proof. Suppose first that (A1) and (A4) hold. Then, ∀X0|B0, X1|B1 ∈ DLIN ,
we obtain, using (A1) at the first inequality and (A4) at the second,
sup{B1(X1 − P (X1|B1))−B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))|B0 ∨B1} ≥
P (B1(X1 − P (X1|B1))|B0 ∨B1)− P (B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))|B0 ∨B1) = 0.
Therefore, P is 2-convex.
Conversely, let P be 2-convex. Then, the proof that (A1) and (A4) hold is
part of the proof of Theorem 8 in [13].
To point out an important consequence of Proposition 2, compare it with
Proposition 1 b). It follows at once that the difference between 2-convexity and
convexity, on DLIN , is due to axiom (A5). On the other hand, the proof that
a convex prevision on DLIN must satisfy (A5), given in [13, Theorem 8], only
involves a gain Gc made up of 3 elementary gains, i.e. it does not fully exploit
convexity, but only 3-convexity. This justifies the following conclusion:
Proposition 3. On DLIN , n-convexity with n ≥ 3 and convexity are equivalent
concepts.
Hence, the very difference between convexity and n-convexity reduces to that
between convexity and 2-convexity, at least on DLIN . Yet, if P is defined on a
set D other than DLIN , we may think of extending it to some DLIN ⊃ D. If
P is n-convex on D, n ≥ 3, and has an n-convex extension to DLIN , then P is
convex on DLIN and therefore also on D. It ensues that if P is n-convex (n ≥ 3)
but not convex on D, P will have no n-convex extension on any sufficiently large
superset of D (any D∗ including some DLIN containing D) - see also the later
Example 2 in Section 4.1. This is a negative aspect of n-convexity, when n ≥ 3.
More generally, the discussion above shows that n-convex previsions are not
particularly significant as an autonomous concept, when n ≥ 3.
3.2 The 2-convex natural extension
Turning again to 2-convex previsions, let us define a special extension, the 2-
convex natural extension.
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Definition 4. Given a lower prevision P : D → R and an arbitrary conditional
gamble Z|B, let
L(Z|B) = {α : sup{A(X − P (X|A))−B(Z − α)|A ∨B} < 0,
for some X|A ∈ D}. (5)
Then the 2-convex natural extension E2c of P on Z|B is
E2c(Z|B) = supL(Z|B). (6)
In general, L(Z|B) may be empty, in which case E2c(Z|B) = −∞, following
the usual convention for suprema. When L(Z|B) 6= ∅, it is instead possible that
E2c(Z|B) = +∞. The results in the next proposition are helpful in hedging
these two occurrences.
Proposition 4. a) L(Z|B) 6= ∅, if ∃ Y |C ∈ D such that C ⇒ B.
b) Let P be 2-convex and such that 0|B ∈ D and P (0|B) = 0 ∀X|B ∈ D.
Given 0|C /∈ D, the extension of P on D ∪ {0|C} such that P (0|C) = 0 is
2-convex.
c) When L(Z|B) 6= ∅, L(Z|B) = ]−∞, E2c(Z|B)[.
d) If L(Z|B) 6= ∅ and sup(X|A) ≥ P (X|A), ∀X|A ∈ D, then E2c(Z|B) ≤
sup(Z|B), ∀Z|B.
e) Let P be 2-convex and 0|B ∈ D, ∀X|B ∈ D. Then, ∀X|B ∈ D, sup(X|B)
≥ P (X|B) iff P (0|B) ≤ 0.
Proof. Proof of a). Identical to the proof of Proposition 6 in [13].
Proof of b). To check that the extension on D∪{0|C} with P (0|C) = 0 is 2-
convex, we only have to check the suprema of two non-trivial gains in Definition
3: the one arising from buying X|B and selling 0|C, and that corresponding to
buying 0|C and selling X|B.
In the former situation, the gain is
G2c = B(X − P (X|B))− C(0− P (0|C)) = B(X − P (X|B))−B(0− P (0|B)),
and sup(G2c|B∨C) ≥ sup(G2c|B) = sup(B(X−P (X|B))−B(0−P (0|B))|B) ≥
0, using 2-convexity of P on D at the last inequality.
The latter situation can be treated analogously.
Proof of c). We show first that L(Z|B) ⊆ ]−∞, E2c(Z|B)[. Let α ∈ L(Z|B)
such that s = sup{A(X − P (X|A)) − B(Z − α)|A ∨ B} < 0 for some X|A ∈
D. By (6), α ≤ E2c(Z|B). If ex absurdo α = E2c(Z|B), taking δ > 0 such
that s < s + δ < 0, we get sup{A(X − P (X|A)) − B(Z − (α + δ))|A ∨ B} =
sup{A(X−P (X|A))−B(Z−α)+Bδ|A∨B} ≤ s+sup{Bδ|A∨B} ≤ s+δ < 0,
a contradiction.
Conversely, let α ∈] −∞, E2c(Z|B)[. Then there exists β ∈ L(Z|B) : α <
β ≤ E2c(Z|B). Further, sup{A(X−P (X|A))−B(Z−α)|A∨B} ≤ sup{A(X−
P (X|A))−B(Z − β)|A ∨B} < 0, which implies α ∈ L(Z|B).
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Proof of d). We show that sup(Z|B) /∈ L(Z|B). Recalling (5), and since
−B(Z − sup(Z|B)) ≥ 0, sup{A(X − P (X|A)) − B(Z − sup(Z|B))|A ∨ B} ≥
sup{A(X−P (X|A))|A∨B} ≥ sup{A(X−P (X|A))|A} = sup(X|A)−P (X|A) ≥
0. This means that sup(Z|B) /∈ L(Z|B). By c), sup(Z|B) ≥ E2c(Z|B).
Proof of e). If sup(X|B) ≥ P (X|B), ∀X|B ∈ D, then in particular P (0|B) ≤
sup(0|B) = 0.
As for the reverse implication, let P (0|B) ≤ 0. Since P is 2-convex, it holds
that 0 ≤ sup{B(X − P (X|B)) − B(0 − P (0|B))|B} = sup{B(X − P (X|B)) +
BP (0|B)|B} ≤ sup{X|B−P (X|B)} = sup(X|B)−P (X|B), that is P (X|B) ≤
sup(X|B).
Parts a) and b) of Proposition 4 suggest a simple way to ensure E2c(Z|B) 6=
−∞: just add the gamble 0|B to D, putting P (0|B) = 0. To guarantee
E2c(Z|B) 6= +∞, it is sufficient that any 0|C in D (or added to D) is given
a non-positive lower prevision, by d) and e). Clearly, the simplest and most
obvious choice is to put P (0|C) = 0, ∀0|C. This would make P a centered
2-convex lower prevision; in the remainder of this section we do not however
rule out the possibility that P (0|C) 6= 0 for some 0|C.
The properties of the 2-convex natural extension are very similar to those of
the natural extension:
Proposition 5. Let P : D → R be a lower prevision, with D ⊆ DLIN . If E2c
is finite on DLIN , then
a) E2c(X|B) ≥ P (X|B), ∀X|B ∈ D.
b) E2c is 2-convex on DLIN .
c) If P ∗ is 2-convex on DLIN and P ∗(X|B) ≥ P (X|B), ∀X|B ∈ D, then
P ∗(X|B) ≥ E2c(X|B), ∀X|B ∈ DLIN .
d) P is 2-convex on D if and only if E2c = P on D.
e) If P is 2-convex on D, E2c is its smallest 2-convex extension on DLIN .
Proof. Assumptions a)÷e) can be proven in the same way as the corresponding
a)÷e) of Theorem 9 in [13] (regarding properties of the convex natural exten-
sion), with some obvious notation changes and simplifications. In the proof of
a) replace Ec in [13] with E2c. The proof of b) checks that E2c satisfies axioms
(A1) and (A4) (called (D1), (D3) in [13]), according to Proposition 2. This is
done using some special gains, simplifying those in [13]: the summation of the
terms with stakes s1, . . . , sm is replaced by a single term with stake s1 = 1, in
agreement with Definition 3. The proofs of c), d) are analogous, while e) follows
from c) and d).
In words, the 2-convex natural extension dominates P (by a)), characterises
2-convexity (by d)) and is the least-committal 2-convex extension of P (by b),
c), e)).
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3.3 Drawbacks of 2-convexity
Being rather weak a consistency concept, 2-convexity may not satisfy a number
of properties which necessarily hold for coherent lower previsions. For instance,
the positive homogeneity axiom (A2) of Proposition 1, P (λX|B) = λP (X|B),
with λ ≥ 0, may not hold, not even weakening it to
P (λX|B) ≥ λP (X|B),∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
(Unconditional versions of (7) hold for centered convex previsions.)
It can instead be shown that
Proposition 6. If, given λ ∈ R, P is 2-convex on D ⊇ {X|B, λX|B}, then
necessarily
inf{(λ− 1)X|B}+ P (X|B) ≤ P (λX|B) ≤ sup{(λ− 1)X|B}+ P (X|B). (8)
Proof. To obtain the first inequality, apply Definition 3 with X1|B1 = X|B and
X0|B0 = λX|B:
sup{B(X − P (X|B))−B(λX − P (λX|B))|B} ≥ 0 iff
sup{(1− λ)X|B} − P (X|B) + P (λX|B) ≥ 0 iff
P (λX|B) ≥ inf{(λ− 1)X|B)}+ P (X|B).
The proof of the second inequality is analogous (let X1|B1 = λX|B, X0|B0 =
X|B in Definition 3).
Condition (8) seems to be rather mild, as the next example points out.
Example 1. Given D = {X|B, 2X|B} (λ = 2), where the image of X|B is
[−1, 1] and P (X|B) = 0.2, equation (8) gives the bounds P (2X|B) ∈ [−0.8, 1.2].
It is easy to check that P is 2-convex on D whatever is the choice for P (2X|B)
in the interval [−0.8, 1.2]. Depending on the value for P (2X|B) selected in this
interval, it may be P (2X|B) R 2P (X|B).
An annoying feature of 2-convexity is that internality may fail, i.e. P (X|B)
need not belong to the closed interval [inf(X|B), sup(X|B)]. Thus, 2-convex
previsions may not satisfy a property holding even for 1-coherent previsions.
It has to be noticed that 2-convexity permits no complete freedom in de-
parting from internality. There are two issues to be emphasized with respect
to this question. The first tells us that lack of internality cannot be two-sided,
because of the following result.
Proposition 7. If P : D → R is 2-convex on D and P (Y |D) < inf(Y |D) for
some Y |D ∈ D, then P (X|B) ≤ sup(X|B), ∀X|B ∈ D. Similarly, P (Y |D) >
sup(Y |D) for some Y |D ∈ D implies P (X|B) ≥ inf(X|B), ∀X|B ∈ D.
Proof. We equivalently prove that there are noX|B, Y |D ∈ D such that P (X|B)
> sup(X|B) and P (Y |D) < inf(Y |D).
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By contradiction, take δ,  > 0 and suppose
P (X|B) = sup(X|B) + δ, P (Y |D) = inf(Y |D)− . (9)
Then, G2c|B ∨D = B(X − (sup(X|B) + δ))−D(Y − (inf(Y |D)− ))|B ∨D is
such that sup(G2c|B ∨D) < 0. In fact, sup(G2c|B ∨D) = max{sup(G2c|¬B ∧
D), sup(G2c|B ∧ ¬D), sup(G2c|B ∧D)} and we have:
• sup(G2c|¬B ∧D) = sup(−D(Y − inf(Y |D) + )|¬B ∧D) = sup(−Y |¬B ∧
D) + inf(Y |D)−  = inf(Y |D)− inf(Y |¬B ∧D)−  ≤ − < 0;
• sup(G2c|B ∧ ¬D) = sup(X|B ∧ ¬D)− sup(X|B)− δ ≤ −δ < 0;
• sup(G2c|B ∧D) = sup(X|B ∧D)− sup(X|B)− δ+ inf(Y |D)− inf(Y |B ∧
D)−  ≤ −δ −  < 0.
Therefore, any P satisfying (9) is not 2-convex, according to Definition 3.
The second issue is that 2-convexity imposes a sort of, so to say, two-
component internality. To see this, note that
Lemma 1. If P : D → R is 2-convex on D, and X|B, Y |B ∈ D, then
inf{X − Y |B} ≤ P (X|B)− P (Y |B) ≤ sup{X − Y |B}. (10)
Proof. The second inequality in (10) is axiom (A1), a necessary condition for
2-convexity which implies also the first inequality. In fact, inf{X − Y |B} =
− sup{Y −X|B} ≤ −(P (Y |B)− P (X|B)) = P (X|B)− P (Y |B).
Recall now that P (X|B) is interpreted as a supremum buying price for
X|B, and that Definition 3 ensures that buying X|B for P (X|B) and selling
Y |B at its supremum buying price P (Y |B) would be (marginally) acceptable
for 2-convexity. Then, equation (10) tells us that the profit P (X|B)− P (Y |B)
from this two-component exchange (X|B vs. Y |B) guarantees no arbitrage. For
instance, it cannot exceed the income upper bound sup{X − Y |B}.
As a further questionable feature of 2-convexity, the Goodman-Nguyen re-
lation may not induce an agreeing ordering on a 2-convex prevision. This is
tantamount to saying that the partial ordering of some 2-convex conditional
previsions may conflict with the ordering of the extended implication (inclu-
sion) relation ≤GN .
For instance, from (2), if B ⇒ C then 0|C ≤GN 0|B. Agreement with the
Goodman-Nguyen relation requires P (0|C) ≤ P (0|B) to hold, but it can be
proven that if P (0|B) < 0 and B ⇒ C, then 2-convexity asks instead that
P (0|C) ≥ P (0|B) (the inequality may be strict).
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3.4 Centered 2-convex lower previsions
The critical issues of 2-convexity discussed in the preceding section can be solved
or softened requiring the additional property
∀X|B ∈ D, 0|B ∈ D and P (0|B) = 0,
i.e. restricting our attention to centered 2-convex conditional lower previsions.
This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let P : D → R be a centered 2-convex lower prevision on D.
Then,
a) ∀X|B ∈ D, P (X|B) ∈ [inf(X|B), sup(X|B)].
b) P has a finite 2-convex natural extension E2c on any superset of D.
c) X|B ≤GN Y |D implies P (X|B) ≤ P (Y |D).
Proof. Proof of a). Put Y |B = 0|B and P (0|B) = 0 in (10).
Proof of b). The statement follows from Proposition 4.
Proof of c). Proven in [15, Proposition 10] for C-convex previsions. As noted
in the Discussion following Proposition 10 in [15], the very same proof applies
to centered 2-convex previsions too (cf. also Footnote 2).
Comment. The condition P (0|B) = 0 seems to be obvious, and in fact guar-
antees more satisfactory properties to 2-convexity. In our view, the main reason
for considering the alternative P (0|B) 6= 0 is to encompass additional uncer-
tainty models. This is patent already in the unconditional framework: convex
risk measures, as introduced in [8, 9], correspond to convex, not necessarily
centered previsions [11].
Note that centered 2-convexity implies 1-coherence, by Proposition 8 a),
while being obviously implied by 2-coherence. Hence, the centering condition
P (0|B) = 0 may be regarded as a technical instrument to guarantee that the
lower prevision P ensures more satisfactory properties than a generic 2-convex
prevision, without having to assume 2-coherence.
4 2-coherent lower previsions
Our next step is a discussion of which additional properties are achieved by a
2-coherent lower prevision.
Definition 5. P : D → R is a 2-coherent lower prevision on D iff ∀X0|B0,
X1|B1 ∈ D, ∀s1 ≥ 0, ∀s0 ∈ R, defining S(s) =
∨{Bi : si 6= 0, i = 0, 1},
G2 = s1B1(X1 − P (X1|B1)) − s0B0(X0 − P (X0|B0)) we have that, whenever
S(s) 6= ∅,
sup{G2|S(s)} ≥ 0. (11)
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2-coherent lower previsions are characterized on DLIN as follows:
Proposition 9. Let P : DLIN → R be a conditional lower prevision. P is
2-coherent on DLIN if and only if (A1), (A2), (A4) and the following axiom
hold:
(A6) P (λX|B) ≤ λP (X|B), ∀λ < 0.
Proof. We prove first that if (A1), (A2), (A4) and (A6) hold, then P is 2-
coherent on DLIN . Recalling for this Definition 5, take any two X0|B0, X1|B1 ∈
DLIN , and any s1 ≥ 0, s0 ∈ R. Then, using (A1) at the first inequality, (A2)
(when s0 ≥ 0) or (A2) and (A6) (when s0 < 0) at the second inequality, we
obtain:
sup{[s1B1(X1 − P (X1|B1))]− [s0B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))]|S(s)} ≥
P (s1B1(X1 − P (X1|B1))|S(s))− P (s0B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))|S(s)) ≥
s1P (B1(X1 − P (X1|B1))|S(s))− s0P (B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))|S(s)) = 0,
where the equality holds because, when si 6= 0, siP (Bi(Xi−P (Xi|Bi))|S(s)) =
siP (Bi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi ∧ S(s)))|S(s)) = 0 (i = 1, 2) by (A4).
Conversely, if P is 2-coherent, therefore also 2-convex, on DLIN , (A1) and
(A4) hold by Proposition 2. Hence, it only remains to prove (A2) and (A6).
We prove first (A6). Apply Definition 5, with X1|B1 = X|B, X0|B0 =
λX|B, s1 = 1, s0 = 1λ < 0: sup(B(X − P (X|B)) − 1λB(λX − P (λX|B))|B) =
sup(−P (X|B)
+ 1λP (λX|B)) ≥ 0, which is equivalent to P (λX|B) ≤ λP (X|B).
As for (A2), consider the same assumptions of the proof of (A6). Since now
s0 =
1
λ > 0, we obtain the inequality P (λX|B) ≥ λP (X|B). Assuming instead
X1|B1 = λX|B, X0|B0 = X|B, s1 = 1λ , s0 = 1, we obtain the reverse inequality
P (λX|B) ≤ λP (X|B).
Comment A comparison of Propositions 2 and 9 is useful for detecting two
major differences between (centered) 2-convex and 2-coherent previsions.
One is positive homogeneity (axiom (A2)), a condition which, on any set
D, is necessary for 2-coherence, but not for 2-convexity. The need for positive
homogeneity depends on the specific model we wish to consider. We might be
willing to reject it in some instance, typically because of liquidity risk consid-
erations. Basically, this means that for a large positive λ difficulties might be
encountered at exchanging λX|B at a price P (λX|B) = λP (X|B), because of
lack of market liquidity at some degree.
The second difference is pointed out by axiom (A6). To fix its meaning,
recall that given P (X|B), its conjugate upper prevision P (X|B) is defined by
P (X|B) = −P (−X|B). (12)
Hence, axiom (A6) ensures by (12) that
P (X|B) ≥ P (X|B),∀X|B ∈ DLIN .
Therefore, 2-coherence is preferable to 2-convexity whenever we fix an upper
(P ) and a lower (P ) bound for the uncertainty evaluation of X|B, while keeping
positive homogeneity.
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4.1 2-coherence versus n-coherence
Compare Propositions 9 and 1, a). Recalling that (A6) is a necessary condition
for 2-coherence and hence also for coherence, only the superlinearity axiom (A3)
distinguishes 2-coherence and coherence on DLIN . From this, deductions on the
role of n-coherence, n ≥ 3, can be made which are quite analogue to those on
n-convexity in Section 3. This time, it can be shown that any n-coherent lower
prevision, n ≥ 3, must satisfy (A3), and hence that:
Proposition 10. On DLIN , n-coherence with n ≥ 3 and coherence are equiva-
lent concepts.
And again, we may in general argue that n-coherence has no special rele-
vance, compared to coherence, when n ≥ 3. In particular, n-coherent extensions
of an n-coherent P exist on sufficiently large sets if and only if P is coherent.
The latter concept is illustrated in the next example, elaborating on Example
2.7.6 in [21].
Example 2. Let IP = {a, b, c, d} be a partition of the sure event Ω. Define P
on the powerset of IP as follows:
• P (Ω) = 1
• P (E) = 12 if E is made up of 2 or 3 elements of IP , one of which is a.
• P (E) = 0 otherwise.
It is shown in [21] that P is not coherent, while being 3-coherent, and hence also
3-convex. We show now that P has no 3-convex extension to the linear space
L(IP ) of all gambles defined on IP .
In fact, suppose a 3-convex extension, also termed P , exists, and define
A = a, B = a∨b, C = a∨c, D = a∨d. Note that, by applying (A1) with X = 12A,
Y = A and B = Ω, we get P ( 12A) ≤ P (A) + sup(− 12A) = P (A) = 0. Therefore,
also the 3-convex extension of P to 14 (B + C + D − 1) = 12A should be non-
positive. Note also that P (−1) = −1 (use (A1) with X = 0, Y = −1, B = Ω, to
get P (−1) ≥ −1, which is what is needed next; interchanging X and Y in (A1)
gives also P (−1) ≤ −1). By applying axiom (A5) as a necessary condition for
3-convexity, we obtain P ( 14 (B+C +D− 1)) = P ( 12 ( 12B+ 12C) + 12 ( 12D− 12 )) ≥
1
2P (
1
2B+
1
2C)+
1
2P (
1
2D− 12 ) ≥ 14P (B)+ 14P (C)+ 14P (D)+ 14P (−1) ≥ 3· 14 · 12− 14 =
1
8 > 0, a contradiction.
From what we have just proven, we may conclude that:
a) the given P on the powerset of IP has no 3-convex extension to L(IP );
b) P (viewed now as 3-coherent on the powerset of IP ) has no 3-coherent
extension on L(IP ) either: if it had one, this extension would be 3-convex
too, contradicting a).
It is interesting to realise that, on DLIN , convexity is what is missing to
2-coherence (and viceversa) to achieve coherence:
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Proposition 11. P : DLIN → R is coherent iff it is both 2-coherent and convex.
Proof. Clearly, coherence implies both 2-coherence and convexity.
Conversely, let P be both 2-coherent and convex on DLIN . By Propositions
1 and 9, it only remains to check that (A3) holds to ensure coherence of P . In
fact, by (A5) and (A2), we have
P (X + Y |B) = P ( 12 (2X) + 12 (2Y )|B) ≥
1
2P (2X|B) + 12P (2Y |B) = P (X|B) + P (Y |B).
(13)
4.2 The 2-coherent natural extension
2-coherent lower probabilities, being also centered 2-convex and 1-AUL, always
have a 2-convex natural extension.
Appreciably, they further ensure the existence of a 2-coherent natural ex-
tension. This tells us that the additional properties of 2-coherence are stable,
in the sense that they can be preserved by extension to any set of conditional
gambles.
The role of the 2-coherent natural extension is analogous for 2-coherence to
that of the 2-convex natural extension for 2-convexity, and most derivations are
quite similar. We shall demonstrate in detail only the most differing ones.
Definition 6. Given a lower prevision P : D → R and an arbitrary Z|B, let
L2(Z|B) = {α : sup{s1A(X − P (X|A))−B(Z − α)|S(s)} < 0
for some X|A ∈ D, s1 ≥ 0}.
where
S(s) =
{
A ∨B if s1 > 0
B if s1 = 0.
Then, the 2-coherent natural extension E2 of P on Z|B is
E2(Z|B) = supL2(Z|B).
Proposition 12 (Existence of the 2-coherent natural extension). Given a lower
prevision P : D → R,
a) L2(Z|B) is non-empty, ∀Z|B.
b) L2(Z|B) =]−∞, E2(Z|B)[.
c) If P is 1-AUL, E2(Z|B) ≤ sup(Z|B), ∀Z|B.
d) If P is not a 1-AUL prevision, ∃Z|B ∈ D such that E2(Z|B) = +∞.
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Proof. Proof of a). Take α < inf(Z|B) and let X|A be any conditional gamble
in D. Then, putting s1 = 0 in Definition 6, sup{s1A(X − P (X|A)) − B(Z −
α)|S(s)} = sup{−B(Z − α)|B} = α + sup{−Z|B} = α − inf{Z|B} < 0, i.e.
α ∈ L2(Z|B).
Proofs of b) and c). Same as the proofs of, respectively, Proposition 4c) and
Proposition 4d), replacing A(X − P (X|A)) with s1A(X − P (X|A)).
Proof of d). Let P be not 1-AUL. Then, ∃ Z|B ∈ D, s > 0 such that
sup{sB(Z − P (Z|B))|B} < 0. Clearly, this implies P (Z|B)− sup{Z|B} > 0.
Then, ∀s1 > 1, ∀α such that α < sup{Z|B} + s1(P (Z|B) − sup{Z|B}),
we get sup{s1B(Z − P (Z|B))−B(Z − α)|B} = α− sup{Z|B} − s1(P (Z|B)−
sup{Z|B}) < 0, i.e. α ∈ L2(Z|B). Since α can be chosen arbitrarily large in
L2(Z|B) by increasing s1, E2(Z|B) = +∞.
Remark 3. Proposition 12 ensures that the condition of 1-AUL is necessary
and sufficient for the finiteness of the 2-coherent natural extension E2.
Proposition 13 (Properties of the 2-coherent natural extension). Let D ⊆
DLIN and P : D → R. If E2 is finite on DLIN , then
a) E2(X|B) ≥ P (X|B),∀X|B ∈ D.
b) E2 is 2-coherent on DLIN .
c) If P ′ is 2-coherent on DLIN and P ′(X|B) ≥ P (X|B),∀X|B ∈ D, then
P ′ ≥ E2 on DLIN .
d) P is 2-coherent on D if and only if E2 = P on D.
e) If P is 2-coherent on D, E2 is its smallest 2-coherent extension on DLIN .
Proof. Proof of a). See the proof of Theorem 9, a) in [13].
Proof of b). By Proposition 9, we prove that E2 satisfies axioms (A1), (A2),
(A4), (A6).
(A1) and (A4): see the proof that, respectively, axioms (D1) and (D3) hold in
[13], Theorem 9, b) (with the obvious modifications G1 = s1B1(X1−P (X1|B1)),
s1 ≥ 0).
(A2): The proof corresponds to that for axiom (A2) in [14], Theorem 3, p.
625 (conditioning now G1 on S(s)).
(A6): To prove (A6), follow the next two steps:
1) It should be proven that
E2(λX|B) ≤ λE2(X|B),∀λ < 0.
Since we already know that (A2) holds, we can use it to write E2(λX|B) =
E2(−λ(−X)|B) = −λE2(−X|B) ≤ λE2(X|B) if and only if −E2(−X|B)
≥ E2(X|B).
Therefore, we can equivalently prove instead that
E2(X|B) + E2(−X|B) ≤ 0. (14)
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2) We prove (14). Take arbitrarily α+ ∈ L2(X|B), α− ∈ L2(−X|B). Letting
gi = siBi(Xi−P (Xi|Bi)), si ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, we have by the definition of
L2(X|B), L2(−X|B):
sup(g1 −B(X − α+)|B1 ∨B) = sup(Z1|B1 ∨B) < 0,
sup(g2 −B(−X − α−)|B2 ∨B) = sup(Z2|B2 ∨B) < 0.
Defining H = B ∨B1 ∨B2, it holds also that
sup(Z1 + Z2|H) = sup(g1 + g2 +B(α+ + α−)|H) < 0. (15)
In fact, decompose H into the sum of 4 disjoint events as follows:
H = B ∨ (B1 ∧B2 ∧ ¬B) ∨ (¬B1 ∧B2 ∧ ¬B) ∨ (B1 ∧ ¬B2 ∧ ¬B). (16)
Now condition Z1 and Z2 on any of the 4 events in (16) that are not
impossible. Let Hj be the generic such event and J = {j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} :
Hj 6= ∅}. Then note that sup{Zi|Hj} ≤ 0, (i = 1, 2). In fact, considering
Z1, if Hj is any of B, B1∧B2∧¬B or B1∧¬B2∧¬B, then sup{Z1|Hj} ≤
sup{Z1|B1 ∨B} < 0, whilst sup{Z1|¬B1 ∧B2 ∧¬B} = sup{0|¬B1 ∧B2 ∧
¬B} = 0. Similarly, sup{Z2|Hj} ≤ 0, with equality iff Hj = B1 ∧ ¬B2 ∧
¬B. It ensues also that the two suprema sup{Z1|Hj}, sup{Z2|Hj} cannot
be simultaneously null, for j ∈ J .
Hence, sup(Z1|H)+sup(Z2|H) = max{sup(Z1|Hj)+sup(Z2|Hj), j ∈ J} <
0. The inequality (15) follows, since sup(Z1 + Z2|H) ≤ sup(Z1|H) +
sup(Z2|H). Further,
sup(g1 + g2|H) ≥ sup(g1 + g2|B1 ∨B2) ≥ 0.
using 2-coherence of P on D at the last inequality.
Therefore, in order for inequality (15) to hold, necessarily α+ + α− < 0,
i.e. α+ < −α−, ∀α+ ∈ L2(X|B), α− ∈ L2(−X|B). Equivalently,
sup{α+ ∈ L2(X|B)} = E2(X|B) ≤ inf{−α− : α− ∈ L2(−X|B)} =
− sup{α− ∈ L2(−X|B)} = −E2(X|B),
which gives (14).
Proofs of c) and d). Analogous to the proof of Theorem 9, c) and d) in [13].
Proof of e). Implied by c) and d).
We may thus conclude that centered 2-convexity and 2-coherence appear to
be the most significant weakenings of (centered) convexity and coherence.
4.3 About the Generalised Bayes Rule
By Propositions 2 and 9, the Generalised Bayes Rule (GBR) is a necessary
consistency condition for both 2-convex and 2-coherent lower previsions. This
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guarantees that this key updating rule holds even with weaker consistency con-
cepts than coherence or convexity. However, it would be erroneous to believe
that nothing about the GBR changes with such looser consistency requirements.
To see this, put B = Ω in (A4), getting
P (A(X − P (X|A))) = 0,
which informs us that P (X|A) is a solution of the equation
P (A(X − r)) = 0. (17)
From Proposition 9 in [13], we know that if P is convex on D ⊃ {A,X|A,A(X−
P (X|A))} and P (A) > 0, then P (X|A) is the unique solution of (17). A
uniqueness result for coherent lower previsions is given in [21], Sec. 6.4.1.
With 2-coherent or 2-convex lower previsions, P (X|A) may no longer be the
unique solution of (17). The next result illustrates this for 2-coherence.
Proposition 14. Let P : D = {A,X|A,A(X − r), A(X − q)} → R be a lower
prevision, such that r 6= q, P (A(X − r)) = P (A(X − q)) = 0, A 6= Ω, 1 ≥
P (A) > 0. Then P is 2-coherent on D if and only if
P (X|A), r, q ∈ [inf(X|A), sup(X|A)]. (18)
Proof. Suppose first that (18) holds. To prove that P is 2-coherent on D, we
may check by Definition 5 that any admissible gain G2 satisfies (11). For this,
we consider the gains from betting on all couples of elements of D (and their
special cases s0 = 0 or s1 = 0, where the effective bet is on a single element).
These gains may be partitioned into two groups:
1. Gains from bets on the couples (X|A,A(X−r)), (X|A,A(X−q)), (A(X−
r), A(X − q)).
The proofs that all such gains satisfy (11) are very similar for all couples.
To exemplify, take the couple (X|A,A(X − r)). Any admissible gain is
either of
G2 = s1A(X − P (X|A))− s0A(X − r);
G′2 = s1A(X − r)− s0A(X − P (X|A)).
Let us first look at G2. If s0 6= 0, G2|S(s) = G2|Ω, and supG2 ≥
G2(¬A) = 0. If s0 = 0 (and s1 > 0), sup(G2|S(s)) = sup(G2|A) =
s1 sup(X|A− P (X|A)) ≥ 0 by (18).
Consider now G′2. If s1 6= 0, G′2|S(s) = G′2|Ω, and supG′2 ≥ G′2(¬A) = 0.
Let then s1 = 0, hence S(s) = A.
If s0 > 0, sup(G
′
2|S(s)) = sup(−s0A(X−P (X|A))|A) = s0 sup(P (X|A)−
X|A) = s0(P (X|A)− inf(X|A)) ≥ 0 by (18).
If s0 < 0, sup(G
′
2|S(s)) = sup(−s0A(X −P (X|A))|A) = −s0(sup(X|A)−
P (X|A)) ≥ 0, again by (18).
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2. Gains from betting on one of the remaining three couples.
All such couples include A, and the proof is identical for each of them.
Take for instance the couple (A,X|A). The related gains are
G2 = s1(A− P (A))− s0A(X − P (X|A));
G′2 = s1A(X − P (X|A))− s0(A− P (A)).
Consider G2. If s1 = 0 (and s0 6= 0), G2 coincides with G′2 in 1., case
s1 = 0. Hence the same derivation and conclusions apply.
Let now s1 > 0, hence S(s) = Ω. Then sup(G2|Ω) ≥ sup(G2|A) ≥ 0. The
last inequality holds because
sup(G2|A) = s1(1− P (A)) + s0P (X|A) + sup(−s0X|A) (19)
and from (18), (19) we obtain:
if s0 ≥ 0, sup(G2|A) ≥ s1(1− P (A)) + s0 inf(X|A)− s0 inf(X|A) ≥ 0;
if s0 < 0, sup(G2|A) ≥ s1(1− P (A)) + s0 sup(X|A)− s0 sup(X|A) ≥ 0.
Referring to G′2, if s0 = 0 then S(s) = A, sup(G
′
2|A) = s1(sup(X|A) −
P (X|A)) ≥ 0 by (18).
When s0 6= 0, S(s) = Ω and supG′2 = max{sup(G′2|A), sup(G′2|¬A)} ≥ 0.
In fact, if s0 > 0 then sup(G
′
2|¬A) = s0P (A) > 0. If s0 < 0, sup(G′2|A) =
−s1P (X|A)−s0(1−P (A))+s1 sup(X|A) ≥ −s1 sup(X|A)−s0(1−P (A))+
s1 sup(X|A) ≥ 0.
Conversely, let now P be 2-coherent. Since P is also 1-coherent, P (X|A) satisfies
condition (18). To see that also r does so (the proof for q is identical), note that
the gain
G2 = s1(A− P (A))−A(X − r), s1 > 0
is such that supG2 ≥ 0, by (11). Since sup(G2|¬A) = −s1P (A) < 0, necessarily
sup(G2|A) = s1(1− P (A)) + r − inf(X|A) ≥ 0, that is
inf(X|A) ≤ r + s1(1− P (A)),∀s1 > 0.
From the above inequality, r ≥ inf(X|A).
To prove that r ≤ sup(X|A), consider the gain
G′2 = A(X − r)− s0(A− P (A)), s0 < 0,
and note that G′2|¬A = s0P (A) < 0. This implies, for any s0 < 0, sup(G′2|A) =
sup(X|A)− r − s0(1− P (A)) ≥ 0. Hence, r ≤ sup(X|A).
Comment. Proposition 14 establishes that equation (17) has more solutions,
when P is 2-coherent. Actually, there are infinitely many, provided they comply
with the internality condition (18). Lack of uniqueness means also that we are
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not obliged to choose one of these solutions: any two of them can 2-coherently
coexist in the set D of Proposition 14. Even as many solutions as we wish
may be found in a single 2-coherent assessment. Just think that this does not
essentially alter the proof of Proposition 14, since 2-coherence restricts checking
it on gains referring to (at most) couples of gambles.
Since a 2-coherent prevision is also 2-convex, it is clear that the GBR will
generally not be the unique solution of equation (17) even when P is 2-convex.
We omit detailing this case.
5 Weakly consistent uncertainty models
As mentioned in the Introduction, a motivation for studying the loose forms of
consistency introduced in this paper is their capability of encompassing or ex-
tending uncertainty models already investigated in the literature. Even though
these models may depart also considerably from coherence and convexity, they
can nevertheless be accommodated into a unifying betting scheme, ranging from
2-convex to coherent lower previsions.
5.1 Capacities and niveloids
Focusing on 2-convexity, we first recall a few definitions and some results con-
cerning unconditional 2-convex lower previsions.
Definition 7. Given a finite partition IP , and denoting with 2IP its powerset,
a mapping c : 2IP → [0, 1] is a (normalised) capacity whenever c(∅) = 0,
c(Ω) = 1 (normalisation) and ∀A1, A2 ∈ 2IP such that A1 ⇒ A2, c(A1) ≤ c(A2)
(1-monotonicity).
Definition 8. Given a linear space L of random variables, a niveloid [3, 7] is
a functional N : L → R = R ∪ {−∞,+∞} which is translation invariant and
monotone, i.e. such that
N(X + µ) = N(X) + µ,∀X ∈ L,∀µ ∈ R;
X ≥ Y implies N(X) ≥ N(Y ),∀X,Y ∈ L. (20)
As well-known, capacities are uncertainty measures with really minimal
quantitative requirements. Niveloids can be viewed as a generalisation of ca-
pacities to linear spaces of random variables which preserves their minimality
properties. Strictly speaking, this is true for centered niveloids, i.e. such that
N(0) = 0. In fact, the centering condition N(0) = 0 does not ensue from the
definition of niveloid. Note also that niveloids apply to random variables which
may be unbounded too.
It has been proven in [2, Section 4.1]3 that:
Proposition 15. a) Let P be defined on 2IP . Then P is a centered 2-convex
lower prevision if and only if it is a capacity.
3 See Footnote 2.
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b) Let P be defined on a linear space L of gambles. Then P is a 2-convex
lower prevision if and only if it is a (finite-valued) niveloid.
Hence, an unconditional 2-convex lower prevision is equivalent to a capacity
or a niveloid, on structured sets (2IP or L respectively). On non-structured sets,
it extends these concepts.
2-convex conditional lower previsions are natural candidates to define con-
ditional capacities and niveloids on arbitrary sets of, respectively, conditional
events or gambles. To the best of our knowledge, such conditional versions have
not been considered yet in this general conditional environment, but rather in
more specific cases. For instance, [4] focuses on updating rules for ‘convex’ ca-
pacities, which means for 2-monotone lower probabilities, while considering a
single conditioning event.
Thus 2-convex previsions may provide an appropriate framework for such ex-
tensions, guaranteeing some minimal properties like the existence of a 2-convex
natural extension (when being centered). Take for instance centered 2-convex
conditional lower probabilities. They satisfy the properties one would require to
a conditional capacity: P (0|B) = 0, P (Ω|B) = 1 (this follows from Proposition
8, a)), and A|B ≤GN C|D implies P (A|B) ≤ P (C|D) (Proposition 8, c)). Simi-
larly, centered 2-convex lower previsions ensure generalisations of properties (20)
(see especially Proposition 2 and Remark 1 for the first property, Proposition
8, c) for the second).
5.2 Value-at-Risk (VaR)
Several examples of weakly consistent models may be found among the many
risk measures that have been proposed in the financial literature. We shall
discuss here Value-at-Risk (VaR), probably the most widespread such measure.
A risk measure ρ is a map ρ : D → R assigning a number ρ(X) to each gamble
X ∈ D, aiming at measuring how ‘risky’ X is. Risk measures are strongly
connected to imprecise previsions: any risk measure ρ(X) on X corresponds to
the opposite −P (X) of a lower prevision for X [12].
Because of this correspondence, we may transpose concepts developed for
imprecise probability theory to risk measurement (and vice versa). Hence it is
possible to check whether a certain risk measure is coherent, convex, or at least
2-coherent or 2-convex, according to whether the corresponding P = −ρ is so.
As for VaR, it is essentially a quantile-based measure:
Definition 9 ([1]). Given a gamble X, a probability P on {(X ≤ x) : x ∈ R},
and a real α ∈]0, 1[, the Value-at-Risk of X at level α is:4
V aRα(X) = − inf{x ∈ R : P (X ≤ x) > α}. (21)
4In alternative definitions of VaR, cf. [6, Sec. 2.3.1], the minus in (21) is omitted (this
corresponds to reasoning in terms of losses) and/or the strict inequality in the inf is weak.
Their consistency properties are the same.
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It is known that VaR is not coherent, although it may be so under some
additional, rather strong assumptions [12]. Which are then its guaranteed con-
sistency properties? This amounts to investigating the consistency of a lower
prevision PVα (X) = −V aRα(X), by the correspondence mentioned above. The
next proposition ensures that VaR is centered 2-convex, while Example 3 shows
that it may even fail to be 2-coherent.
Proposition 16. Let L be a linear space of gambles, α ∈]0, 1[ and P a proba-
bility on
⋃
X∈L{(X ≤ x) : x ∈ R}. Define PVα as
PVα (X) = −V aRα(X) = inf{x ∈ R : P (X ≤ x) > α},∀X ∈ L.
Then PVα is a centered 2-convex lower prevision.
Proof. By Proposition 15 b), PVα is 2-convex iff it is a niveloid, that is iff it is
translation invariant and monotone. Proving translation invariance and mono-
tonicity is essentially the same as proving that V aRα has these properties, which
is well known (cf. [6, Sec. 2.3.2]).
As for centering, recalling (21) we have PVα (0) = −V aRα(0) = 0.
Example 3 (VaR may be 2-incoherent). Let X be a 2-valued gamble such that
P (X = −1) = P (X = 2) = 0.5. Given α = 0.6, it is easy to check using
(21) that PV0.6(X) = −V aR0.6(X) = inf{x : P (X ≤ x) > 0.6} = 2, while
PV0.6(−X) = 1. Hence PV0.6(−X) > −PV0.6(X), meaning that axiom (A6) with
λ = −1 does not hold for PV0.6. Since (A6) is a necessary condition for 2-
coherence, PV0.6 is not 2-coherent.
Remark 4 (2-coherent models). The models we have seen so far are 2-convex.
2-coherence arises naturally with interval evaluations made up of a lower P and
an upper P uncertainty measure, both 2-convex, like a capacity and its conjugate.
In fact, it is then natural to require that P ≤ P , which is a follow-up of equation
(12), implied by 2-coherence. As another instance, we mention p-boxes. While
univariate p-boxes satisfy stronger consistency properties (they correspond to a
couple (P , P ), where both P , P are precise probabilities), bivariate p-boxes may
be related with 2-coherence (cf. [17, Sec. 3.1]).
6 Weak consistency in a desirability approach
In this section we examine 2-convexity and 2-coherence from the viewpoint of de-
sirability. This is an alternative approach to rationality concepts for uncertainty
measures going back to [22] in the case of conditional imprecise previsions. It
has been recently applied to a variety of other situations, see e.g. the discussion
in [18] and the results in [19].
Roughly speaking, a set A of gambles is considered.5 It is such that its
gambles are regarded as desirable or acceptable. We may in general be willing
5 As will appear later, A is included into some fixed linear space of gambles.
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to establish some rationality criteria, requiring that certain gambles do, or do
not, belong to A. The basic problem we shall consider here is: which is the
correspondence between the rationality criteria we adopt and the consistency
concepts of centered 2-convexity or alternatively 2-coherence? More specifically,
the following two questions arise:
Q1) Which rationality criteria should be required to the elements of a set A,
so that a conditional lower prevision P may be obtained from A that is
2-coherent (alternatively, 2-convex)?
Q2) Conversely, given a 2-coherent (alternatively, 2-convex) P , does it deter-
mine a set A′ with certain rationality properties?
In the case that P is coherent, the answer to Q1) and Q2) was given by Williams
in [22]. Our approach to solving Q1) and Q2) was largely influenced by his work.
Preliminarily, some notation must be introduced.
Definition 10. Let X be a linear space of gambles, B ⊂ X a set of (indicators
of) events, B∅ = B\{∅}. We suppose Ω ∈ B and BX ∈ X , ∀B ∈ B, ∀X ∈ X .6
Define then
X = {X ∈ X : inf X ≥ 0},
X = {X ∈ X : supX ≤ 0},
and, ∀B ∈ B,
R(B) = {X ∈ X : BX = X},
R(B) = {X ∈ R(B) : inf{X|B} > 0},
R(B)≺ = {X ∈ R(B) : sup{X|B} < 0}.
If S and T are subsets of X , their Minkowski sum is
S + T = {X + Y : X ∈ S, Y ∈ T }.
We shall use similar compact notation later. For instance, λS + µT ⊆ U ,
∀λ, µ ≥ 0, means: ∀X ∈ S, ∀Y ∈ T , ∀λ, µ ≥ 0, λX + µY ∈ U .
Lemma 2. Properties of the sets R(B):
a) ∀B, R(B) is a linear space.
b) If X ∈ R(B) and B ⇒ A, then X ∈ R(A).
Proof. a) is trivial. As for b), we have AX = IAX = (IB + IA∧¬B)X = IBX =
X.
6 Note that if X ∈ X and B ∈ B∅, X|B ∈ DLIN in the notation of the preceding sections.
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6.1 Desirability axioms for 2-coherent previsions
The following proposition answers question Q1) completely for 2-coherence:
Proposition 17. Let A ⊆ X be such that
a) λA+R(B) ⊆ A, ∀λ ≥ 0, ∀B ∈ B;
b) R(B)≺ ∩ A = ∅, ∀B ∈ B.
c) (R(B1) ∩ A) + (R(B2) ∩ A) ⊆
R(B1 ∨B2) \ R(B1 ∨B2)≺,∀B1, B2 ∈ B.
Define, ∀X|B ∈ DLIN ,
P (X|B) = sup{x ∈ R : B(X − x) ∈ A}. (22)
Then, P is 2-coherent on DLIN .
Proof. The core idea of the proof is to show that, for any given X0|B0, X1|B1 ∈
DLIN , ∀s1 ≥ 0, ∀s0 ∈ R, P defined by (22) is such that G2 satisfies condition
(11) in Definition 5, and therefore P is 2-coherent.
For this, define first the following gambles:
K = sup
(
1∑
i=0
si 6=0
Bi|S(s)
)
, (23)
Si =
{ |si|Bi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)) + si|si|KBi if si 6= 0
0 if si = 0
. (24)
In equation (24), i = 0, 1 and  > 0.
Note that K > 0, as it can take values in {1, 2}. We analyse now the
relationships between S0, S1 in (24) and A. The following facts will be used
later in the proof, when expressing G2 in terms of S0, S1 and K.
i) If si > 0, Si = siBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi)) + KBi ∈ A, i = 0, 1.
In fact, by the definition of P in (22), ∃t ∈ [0, siK [ such that Bi(Xi −
(P (Xi|Bi)− t)) ∈ A.
Writing then
Si = siBi(Xi − (P (Xi|Bi)− siK )) =
siBi(Xi − (P (Xi|Bi)− t)) + siBi( siK − t),
we note that the second term in the summation, siBi(

siK
− t), belongs to
R(Bi). Since the first term is in A, Si ∈ A by assumption a).
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ii) If so < 0, S0 = −s0B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))− KB0 /∈ A.
Suppose by contradiction S0 = −s0B0(X0 − (P (X0|B0) + −s0K )) ∈ A.
Since δB0 ∈ R(B0), ∀δ > 0, assumption a) gives
S0
−s0 + δB0 = B0(X0 − (P (X0|B0) +

−s0K − δ)) ∈ A. (25)
Taking 0 < δ < −s0K , it is P (X0|B0) + −s0K − δ > P (X0|B0), so that
(25) contradicts the definition of P in (22).
The gain G2 is a function of the gambles S0, S1 and K:
G2 =
 S1 + S0 −

K
∑1
i=0
si 6=0
Bi if s0 ≥ 0
S1 − S0 − K
∑1
i=0
si 6=0
Bi if s0 ≤ 0. (26)
Referring to this representation, define T = S1 + S0 if s0 ≥ 0, T = S1 − S0, if
s0 ≤ 0. We prove that sup(T |S(s)) ≥ 0, distinguishing three cases:
• s1 > 0, s0 > 0.
By i), Si ∈ A, i = 0, 1. It is also Si ∈ R(Bi), hence Si ∈ R(Bi) ∩ A, i =
0, 1. Using assumption c) we deduce S1+S0 ∈ R(B0 ∨B1)\R(B0 ∨B1)≺,
which means that sup(S1 + S0|S(s)) ≥ 0.
• s0 < 0.
By contradiction, suppose sup(S1 − S0|S(s)) = sup(T |S(s)) < 0, and
hence inf(−T |S(s)) > 0. If s1 = 0, this means −T = S0 ∈ R(B0). If
s1 > 0, since then −T ∈ R(B0 ∨B1) by Lemma 2, inf(−T |S(s)) > 0
implies −T ∈ R(B0 ∨B1). In both instances, assumption a) can be
applied (with λ = 0 if s1 = 0, recalling instead that S1 ∈ A by i) if
s1 > 0) to deduce S0 ∈ A, which contradicts ii).
• s1 > 0, s0 = 0 or s1 = 0, s0 > 0.
If s1 > 0, s0 = 0, then using i) T = S1 ∈ A ∩ R(B1). By assumption b),
sup(T |S(s)) = sup(S1|B1) ≥ 0.
If s1 = 0, s0 > 0, the argument is analogous.
Recalling (26), T = G2 +

K
∑1
i=0
si 6=0
Bi. Since sup(T |S(s)) ≥ 0 and using the
definition of K at the next equality, we obtain
0 ≤ sup(G2 + K
∑1
i=0
si 6=0
Bi|S(s))
≤ sup(G2|S(s)) + K sup(
∑1
i=0
si 6=0
Bi|S(s))
= sup(G2|S(s)) + .
Thus, sup(G2|S(s)) ≥ −, ∀ > 0, that is sup(G2|S(s)) ≥ 0.
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Unlike the case of coherent conditional lower previsions examined in [22,
Section 3.1], A does not need to be a cone in Proposition 17: given X,Y ∈ A,
λ ≥ 0, neither X+Y nor λX are guaranteed to belong to A. Actually, condition
a) represents a weakening of the cone axioms: if X ∈ A, Y ∈ R(B) and λ ≥ 0,
then λX +Y ∈ A. This implies also R(B) ⊆ A ∀B ∈ B, a condition that, like
also b), is required for coherence as well (see (C1’), (C2’) in [22, Section 3.1]).
The interpretation of b) is that of an avoiding partial loss condition: we can
expect no gain from owning a gamble in R(B)≺, when B is true, therefore such
gambles cannot be included into A.
As for c), writing it in an extended form, it tells us that: if X1, X2 ∈ A,
B1X1 = X1, B2X2 = X2, then (B1 ∨ B2)(X1 + X2) = X1 + X2 and sup(X1 +
X2|B1 ∨ B2) ≥ 0. Note that if X1 ∈ R(B1) and X2 ∈ R(B2), it always holds
that X1 +X2 ∈ R(B1∨B2) by Lemma 2, without having to impose it by means
of axiom c).
Therefore, the essential condition in axiom c) is that if X1, X2 are desirable
(belonging to A), this does not imply that X1 +X2 ∈ A (which is required for
coherence in [22, 23]), but only that X1 + X2 is not necessarily discarded by
resorting to b) with B = B1 ∨ B2. To illustrate this concept, let for instance
B1 = B2 = Ω in c), so that R(B1) = R(B2) = R(B1 ∨B2) = R(Ω) = X . Then,
c) implies X1 +X2 /∈ R(Ω)≺, making impossible to apply b) in order to discard
X1 +X2 from A.
As for question Q2), an answer is given by the following proposition, when
P is 2-coherent.
Proposition 18. Let P : DLIN → R be 2-coherent. Define
A′ = {λB(X − x) + Y : X|B ∈ DLIN , x < P (X|B), Y ∈ X, λ ≥ 0}.
Then the set A′ is such that:
a’) aA′ + X ⊆ A′, ∀a ≥ 0;
b’) X ∩ A′ = {0};
c’) (A′ +A′) \ {0} ⊆ X \ X;
d’) P (X|B) = sup{x ∈ R : B(X − x) ∈ A′}, ∀X|B ∈ DLIN .
Proof. Proof of a’). Take Z1 = λB(X − x) + Y ∈ A′, a ≥ 0 and Z2 ∈ X.
Then, aZ1 + Z2 = aλB(X − x) + aY + Z2, with aλ ≥ 0, X ∈ X , B ∈ B∅,
x ≤ P (X|B) and aY +Z2 ∈ X (because inf(aY +Z2) ≥ a inf Y + inf Z2 ≥ 0).
Therefore aZ1 + Z2 ∈ A′.
Proof of b’). Take Z = λB(X − x) + Y ∈ A′.
If λ = 0, Z = Y ∈ X. Therefore supZ ≥ inf Z ≥ 0, so that Z /∈ X if
Y 6= 0, while Z ∈ X if and only if Y = 0.
If λ > 0, Z ≥ λB(X − x) because Y ≥ inf Y ≥ 0. It follows that
sup(Z|B) ≥ sup(λB(X − x)|B) =
sup(λB(X − P (X|B)) + λB(P (X|B)− x)|B) ≥
sup(λB(X − P (X|B))|B) + inf(λB(P (X|B)− x)|B) > 0
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using the property
sup(X1 +X2) ≥ inf X1 + supX2 (27)
with X1 = λB(P (X|B)− x), X2 = λB(X − P (X|B)) at the second inequality;
the final inequality follows from sup(λB(X − P (X|B))|B) ≥ 0 by 2-coherence
of P (equation (11) with s0 = 0) and from inf(λB(P (X|B) − x)|B) > 0 since
λ > 0, P (X|B) > x.
The above derivation ensures supZ ≥ supZ|B > 0, i.e. Z /∈ X.
Whatever is λ ≥ 0 then, Z ∈ A′ implies either Z /∈ X or Z = 0. Therefore,
since 0 ∈ A′ ∩ X, we have that A′ ∩ X = {0}.
Proof of c’) To establish c’), we prove that for any Z1, Z2 ∈ A′, Z1 +Z2 6= 0,
it holds that sup(Z1 + Z2) > 0.
From the definition of A′, we have that
Zi = λiBi(Xi − xi) + Yi (i = 1, 2).
If λ1 = λ2 = 0, then Zi = Yi ∈ X, i = 1, 2, and at least one of Y1, Y2 is not
zero (because Z1 + Z2 6= 0). If for instance Y1 6= 0, then supY1 > 0 (because
Y1 ∈ X). It follows that sup(Z1 + Z2) = sup(Y1 + Y2) ≥ supY1 + inf Y2 ≥
supY1 > 0, where the first inequality follows from (27).
We may therefore suppose λ1 + λ2 > 0 in the sequel of the proof, defining
S(λ) = ∨{Bi : λi > 0, i = 1, 2}(6= ∅). We have that
Z1 + Z2|S(λ) =
∑2
i=1 λiBi(Xi − xi)|S(λ) + (Y1 + Y2)|S(λ)
=
∑2
i=1 λiBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi))|S(λ)
+
∑2
i=1 λiBi(P (Xi|Bi)− xi)|S(λ) + (Y1 + Y2)|S(λ)
≥∑2i=1 λiBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi))|S(λ) + δ + inf Y1 + inf Y2,
where δ = min
∑2
i=1 λiBi(P (Xi|Bi)−xi)|S(λ). Recalling that λi ≥ 0, P (Xi|Bi)
> xi, λ1 + λ2 > 0, it is easy to realise that δ > 0.
Using this fact in the strict inequality of the following derivation, we obtain
sup(Z1 + Z2) ≥ sup(Z1 + Z2|S(λ)) ≥
sup(
∑2
i=1 λiBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi))|S(λ)) + δ + inf Y1 + inf Y2 >
sup(
∑2
i=1 λiBi(Xi − P (Xi|Bi))|S(λ)) ≥ 0,
the final inequality holding because P is 2-coherent.
Proof of d’) Let S = {x : B(X − x) ∈ A′}.
In the first (and larger) part of the proof, we shall prove that
P (X|B) ≥ x, ∀x ∈ S. (28)
For this, let x ∈ S. Therefore,
B(X − x) = λA(Z − z) + Y, (29)
with λ ≥ 0, A ∈ B∅, Z ∈ X , z < P (Z|A), Y ∈ X. We distinguish the cases
λ = 0 and λ > 0.
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• λ = 0.
From inf(X|B) − x = inf(B(X − x)|B) ≥ inf(B(X − x)) = inf Y ≥ 0
(the last inequality holding because Y ∈ X), we obtain x ≤ inf(X|B).
Therefore also x ≤ P (X|B), because by 2-coherence inf(X|B) ≤ P (X|B).
(Actually, centered 2-convexity is enough for this, by Proposition 8), a).)
• λ > 0.
From (29), B(X − x) ≥ λA(Z − z), hence
sup(λA(Z − z)−B(X − x)) ≤ 0. (30)
Define now
X1 = λA(z − P (Z|A))−B(x− P (X|B))
X2 = λA(Z − P (Z|A))−B(X − P (X|B))−X1
= λA(Z − z)−B(X − x).
Observe that:
i) sup(X1 +X2|A ∨B) ≥ 0.
Since X1 + X2 = λA(Z − P (Z|A)) − B(X − P (X|B)), this follows
from 2-coherence of P (equation (11), with s1 = λ, s0 = 1).
ii) sup(X2|A ∨B) ≤ sup(X2) ≤ 0.
In fact, X2 is the argument of the supremum in equation (30).
Using i) and ii), we obtain
sup(X1|A ∨B) ≥ sup(X1 +X2|A ∨B)− sup(X2|A ∨B)
≥ − sup(X2|A ∨B) ≥ 0.
Now we know that sup(X1|A∨B) ≥ 0. On the other hand, X1|A∨B is a
three-valued gamble (at most), and precisely it takes the following values
λ(z − P (Z|A))− (x− P (X|B)) on A ∧B, when A ∧B 6= ∅;
− (x− P (X|B)) on ¬A ∧B, when ¬A ∧B 6= ∅;
λ(z − P (Z|A)) < 0 on A ∧ ¬B, when A ∧ ¬B 6= ∅.
Therefore, −(x− P (X|B)) ≥ sup(X1|A ∨B) ≥ 0,7 i.e. x ≤ P (X|B).
Thus (28) holds. It remains to observe that ∀x < P (X|B), it is B(X −x) ∈ A′,
by definition of A′ and since 0 ∈ X. This means that x ∈ S. Consequently
P (X|B) = supS = sup{x ∈ R : B(X − x) ∈ A′)}.
7 The first inequality can be strict if ¬A∧B = ∅. Note that ¬A∧B = A∧B = ∅ cannot
occur, since it implies B = ∅.
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Proposition 18 states the existence of a set of desirable gambles A′, in accor-
dance with a given 2-coherent conditional lower prevision P and satisfying the
rationality criteria a’), b’), c’). Comparing a’), b’) with a), b) in Proposition 17,
a clear similarity comes evident: essentially, the sets R(B), R(B)≺, B ∈ B,
have been replaced with X, X respectively. As a consequence, note that
0 ∈ A′.
The interpretation of c’) is similar to c) in Proposition 17. It tells that: if
X1, X2 ∈ A′, X1 + X2 6= 0, then sup(X1 + X2) > 0. Again, coherence would
allow the stronger implication X1, X2 ∈ A′ → X1 +X2 ∈ A′, while 2-coherence
only ensures that X1 +X2 does not belong to the (near) rejection set X.
Actually, a’), b’) c’) prove to be stronger than a), b), c). This means that any
2-coherent conditional prevision can be represented through a set of desirable
gambles A′ satisfying the necessary axioms a’), b’), c’), but also that, at the
same time, A′ satisfies the weaker axioms a), b), c) in Proposition 17.
6.2 Desirability axioms for 2-convex previsions
A comparison between (4) in Definition 3 and (11) in Definition 5 intuitively
suggests that we can get an answer to Q1) for 2-convexity from a reduced form
of Proposition 17, with λ = 1. More precisely, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 19. Let A ⊆ X be such that
a) A+R(B) ⊆ A, ∀B ∈ B;
b) R(B)≺ ∩ A = ∅, ∀B ∈ B.
Define, ∀X|B ∈ DLIN ,
P (X|B) = sup{x ∈ R : B(X − x) ∈ A}. (31)
Then,
1) P is 2-convex on DLIN ;
2) P is centered iff R(B) ⊆ A ∀B ∈ B.
Proof. Proof of 1) The proof is a simplification of that of Proposition 17. Anal-
ogously, it is checked that condition (4) in Definition 3 is satisfied for G2c, where
P is defined by (31). The same steps are followed: first, the definitions of K,
S0, S1 in (23), (24) simplify to
K = sup(B0 +B1|B0 ∨B1),
S0 = B0(X0 − P (X0|B0))− KB0,
S1 = B1(X1 − P (X1|B1)) + KB1.
Then, the following are proven in the same way:
i) S1 ∈ A; ii) S0 /∈ A.
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Equation (26) reduces here to
G2c = S1 − S0 −

K
(B0 +B1)
and defining T = S1−S0, it is sup(T |B0∨B1) ≥ 0 (see the case (s0 < 0, s1 > 0)
in the proof of Proposition 17). This fact is exploited to show that sup(G2c|B0∨
B1) ≥ 0, with the same computations of the final part in the proof of Proposition
17.
Proof of 2) Suppose R(B) ⊆ A. We prove that then P is centered. In fact,
by (31)
P (0|B) = sup{x : −Bx ∈ A},∀0|B ∈ DLIN .
For x < 0, inf(−Bx|B) = −x > 0, so that −Bx ∈ R(B) ⊆ A.
For x > 0, sup(−Bx|B) = −x < 0, which implies −Bx /∈ A by property b).
Therefore sup{x : −Bx ∈ A} = 0, i.e. P (0|B) = 0.
Conversely, suppose now
P (0|B) = sup{x : −Bx ∈ A} = 0,∀0|B ∈ DLIN .
We prove that R(B) ⊆ A in two steps.
i) −Bx ∈ A,∀x < 0.
To see this, take x < 0. By definition of supremum, ∃x˜ : x < x˜ ≤ 0,
−Bx˜ ∈ A. Writing −Bx = −Bx˜ + B(x˜ − x), it is B(x˜ − x) ∈ R(B),
because x˜ − x > 0. By property a), −Bx ∈ A + R(B) ⊆ A, that is
−Bx ∈ A.
ii) R(B) ⊆ A,∀B ∈ B∅.
For the proof, let X ∈ R(B). This implies inf(X|B) > 0, so that δ can
be chosen, such that 0 < δ < inf(X|B). Then
X = BX = B(X − inf(X|B) + δ)−B(δ − inf(X|B)). (32)
Since δ − inf(X|B) < 0, it is −B(δ − inf(X|B)) ∈ A, by i).
Since inf(B(X− inf(X|B)+δ)|B) = inf(X|B)− inf(X|B)+δ > 0, it holds
that B(X − inf(X|B) + δ) ∈ R(B).
Applying axiom a) to the decomposition (32), it ensues that X ∈ A, that
is R(B) ⊆ A.
An analogously reduced form of Proposition 18 allows us to answer question
Q2) for 2-convexity.
Proposition 20. Let P : DLIN → R be 2-convex. Define
A′ = {B(X − x) + Y : X|B ∈ DLIN , x < P (X|B), Y ∈ X}.
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1) The set A′ is such that:
a) A′ + X ⊆ A′;
b) A′ ∩ X = ∅ iff P is 1-AUL;
c) P (X|B) = sup{x ∈ R : B(X − x) ∈ A′}, ∀X|B ∈ DLIN .
2) If P is centered, then R(B) ⊆ A′ ∀B ∈ B; if P is 1-AUL and R(B) ⊆
A′ ∀B ∈ B, then P is centered.
Proof. Proof of 1). Apart from the converse implication in b), the proof is a
simplified version of the proof of Proposition 18. Precisely,
• Proof of a). See proof of a’) in Proposition 18, with λ = 1.
• Proof of b). If P is 1-AUL, then A′ ∩ X = ∅ follows from the proof of
b’) in Proposition 18, taking λ = 1; when proving that sup(Z|B) > 0,
the step resorting to 2-coherence uses now 1-AUL to justify by (3) that
sup(B(X − P (X|B))|B) ≥ 0.
We prove now the converse implication, that if A′ ∩ X = ∅ then P is 1-
AUL. Suppose A′∩X = ∅ while P is not 1-AUL, which means that there
existsX|B such that sup(X|B) < P (X|B). Then Z = B(X−sup(X|B)) ∈
A′, because 0 ∈ X. Since supZ = max(sup(Z|¬B), sup(Z|B)) =
max(0, sup(X|B) − sup(X|B)) = 0, it is also Z ∈ X and therefore Z ∈
A′ ∩ X, contradicting the assumption A′ ∩ X = ∅.
• Proof of c). Special case of the proof of d’) in Proposition 18 (put λ = 1
and derive i) from 2-convexity rather than 2-coherence).
Proof of 2). From c), we may write
P (0|B) = sup{x ∈ R : −Bx ∈ A′},∀0|B ∈ DLIN . (33)
We prove that if P is centered then R(B) ⊆ A′.
Suppose then P centered, which means by (33)
P (0|B) = sup{x : −Bx ∈ A′} = 0,∀B ∈ B∅.
Let us first prove that
−Bx ∈ A′,∀x < 0. (34)
In fact, let x < 0. By the definition of supremum, ∃x˜ : x < x˜ ≤ 0 and −Bx˜ ∈ A′.
Hence −Bx = −Bx˜+B(x˜−x) ∈ A′ by property a), given that B(x˜−x) ∈ X,
since inf(B(x˜− x)) = min(0, x˜− x) = 0.
Now let X ∈ R(B), δ : 0 < δ < inf(X|B). Writing X = B(X −
inf(X|B) + δ) − B(δ − inf(X|B)), it holds that −B(δ − inf(X|B)) ∈ A′, using
(34), and that B(X − inf(X|B) + δ) ∈ X because inf(B(X − inf(X|B) + δ)) =
min(0, inf(X|B)− inf(X|B) + δ) = 0. Therefore X ∈ A′, by property a). Since
a generic X ∈ R(B) has been considered, we have shown that R(B) ⊆ A′.
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Conversely, let us prove now that if P is 1-AUL and R(B) ⊆ A′, then P
is centered.
For this, we show that the supremum in equation (33) is zero, which is
equivalent to P (0|B) = 0,∀0|B ∈ DLIN .
Suppose R(B) ⊆ A′, take x ∈ R, and consider the gamble −Bx ∈ R(B).
If x < 0 then inf(−Bx|B) = −x > 0, so that −Bx ∈ R(B) ⊆ A′. This implies
that the supremum in equation (33) is at least zero.
However, if x > 0, it is sup(−Bx) ≤ 0, hence −Bx ∈ X. By property b),
it follows that −Bx /∈ A′ for any positive x and, therefore, the supremum in
equation (33) is precisely zero.
Comparing Propositions 17 and 18 with, respectively, Propositions 19 and
20, we note that, in addition to the constraint λ = 1, 2-convexity requires no
condition like c) and c’) in Propositions 17 and 18 respectively. Referring, for
instance, to c’), this means that, given X,Y ∈ A′ with X + Y 6= 0, 2-convexity
does not guarantee sup(X + Y ) > 0: summing up two individually desirable
gambles could therefore give rise to a partial or even to a sure loss. Moreover,
a non-centered 2-convex P suffers from a more serious shortcoming: either it
is not even 1-AUL, or R(B) ⊆ A′ does not necessarily hold, meaning that a
non-negative gamble X = BX (X 6= 0) exists that is considered non-desirable.
The main drawbacks of 2-convexity relative to 2-coherence are therefore clearly
pointed out also by a comparison through desirability axioms.
7 Conclusions
N -convex and n-coherent conditional lower previsions broaden the spectrum of
uncertainty measures that can be accommodated into a behavioural approach
to imprecision, including, for instance, conditional extensions of capacities and
niveloids when n = 2. This choice for n is the most neatly distinguished from
coherence, the other extreme in the spectrum, and that retaining more interest-
ing properties. In particular, centered 2-convex and 2-coherent previsions are
stable, meaning that they can be extended on any set preserving their consis-
tency properties. 2-convex and 2-coherent previsions also have a clear meaning
in terms of desirability. We believe that the desirability investigation carried
out in this paper, although still at a foundational level, is important as it dis-
plays first results on how this approach works outside coherence and in the
general conditional framework. Further work is necessary to investigate addi-
tional properties, like the possible existence of envelope theorems, or properties
of already defined notions. In particular, we conjecture that the 2-convex or
2-coherent natural extensions may simplify computing the convex or the coher-
ent natural extensions. As a further generalisation of this work, the consistency
notions defined here could be extended to the case of unbounded conditional
random variables. This has been done in [20] for coherent conditional lower pre-
visions, while, to the best of our knowledge, a similar investigation for convex
conditional previsions is still missing.
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